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Financial instability contagion: a dynamical
systems approach
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We build a multi-agent dynamical system for the global economy to investigate and analyse financial
crises. The agents are large aggregates of a subeconomy, and the global economy is a collection
of subeconomies. We use well-known theories of dynamical systems to represent a financial crisis
as propagation of a negative shock on wealth due the breakage of a financial equilibrium. We first
extend the framework of the market instability indicator, an early warning signal defined for a single
economy as the spectral radius of the Jacobian matrix of the wealth dynamical system. Then, we
formulate a quantitative definition of instability contagion in terms thereof. Finally, we analyse the
mechanism of instability contagion for both single and multiple economies. Our contribution is to
provide a methodology to quantify and monitor the level of instability in sectors and stages of a
structured global economic model and how it may propagate through its components.
Keywords: Sovereign credit; Systemic risk; Contagion; Multi-economy model; Market instability
indicator
JEL Classification: C00, G00

1. Introduction
In the past decade and half or so, the global economy seems to
have entered a regime of recurring instability. The prudence in
the financial markets arising from the crash of the equity bubble
in 2000 quickly abated thanks to powerful global trends and
domestic policies, both fiscal and monetary, only to rekindle
real estate bubbles in many developed and developing countries. Such a trend continued and climaxed in early 2007. In
the US the hallmark of the bubble was the extreme leveraging
attained through tranches of Structured Investment Vehicles
that popularized securitization of loans, asset backed securities
(ABS) and collateralized debt obligations. When the brewing
crisis finally erupted in September 2008, financial markets
nearly froze in the face of systemic uncertainty as to both the
size and the complexity of such assets and the role they played
in the balance sheet of major institutions.
The ensuing crisis induced the US Federal Reserve (the
Fed) in conjunction with the Treasury to implement extreme
measures: injecting equity into the financial sector and buying their illiquid assets in unprecedented amounts. In 2009,
such action was hailed by the financial markets as the only
way to resolve the insolvency of major banks, and other governments followed suit. Credit markets resumed functioning,
panic abated and most asset classes rebounded in value, but
∗ Corresponding author. Email: choiy@mail.montclair.edu

it soon transpired that as in the squeezing of the proverbial
toothpaste tube, the bulk of the risk had simply been shifted
from banks to governments.
Beginning in early 2010, credit markets started focusing on
the risk of the fiscally precarious members of the European
Monetary Union (EMU) (BBC 2012, Wikipedia 2010a). It is
widely agreed that the EMU was put in place without systemic
fiscal institutions. Therefore, individual countries, while still
responsible for their economic policy, have a weak control
of monetary policy. At the same time, sovereign debt was
considered virtually riskless regardless of issuance, which led
banks and other institutions to chase the higher yields of peripheral debt thereby increasing their leverage. In the fall of
2011, the first brush with ‘contagion,’§ from the smaller peripheral economies to Italy and Spain, seemed a fait accompli.
Italian 10-year yields broke the threshold of sustainability of
7% (Trading Economics 2012, Yahoo! Finance 2012). The
emergency lending implemented by the ECB stanched the
liquidity haemorrhage (The Financial Times 2011). However,
just as in the spring of 2009 within the US banking system,
this was much more an issue of solvency. At the same time,

§Such ‘contagion’ follows the qualitative and common usage of the
word. It denotes the spreading of distress in financial, and specifically
debt markets and is different from the quantitative definition we
introduce later.
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austerity alone is unlikely to allow debtor nations to satisfy their
creditors, as Greece has demonstrated (Wikipedia 2010b).
Our goal is to provide a practical way of measuring the
dynamic instability of the financial system, in particular financial risk contagion like the current Eurozone crisis as outlined
above. The second author already jointly carried out such research in the case of one economic system having in sight the
subprime crisis (Choi and Douady 2012, 2013). In this paper,
we extend that framework to the case of multiple economies
as part of a global economic system, and provide a definition
of contagion that is consistent with the previous concepts of
instability. As was the case of the single economy model, we
use the theories of dynamical systems (Brin and Stuck 2003,
Robinson 1999) to investigate financial market instability. We
first divide an economy into n economic aggregates called
agents (cf. Hommes 2008), then we construct a dynamical
system based on the evolution of the corresponding wealths:
f : R × X −→ X , (t, w(t0 )) −→ f t (w(t0 )) = w(t0 + t),
where X ⊂ Rn , w(t0 ) = (w1 (t0 ), w2 (t0 ), . . . , wn (t0 )), and
wi (t0 ) is the initial wealth† of agent i.
The original contribution of this paper is to first extend the
usage of the market instability indicator I (t), introduced in
Choi and Douady (2012) for a single economy system, to a system of multiple economies, then give a quantitative definition
of a ‘contagion’ (of market instability) in terms of I (t). Finally,
we analyse the mechanism of contagion in three categories:
a sector-to-sector contagion within a single economy, crossborder contagion due to counterparty risk and cross-border
contagion due to a fear factor. We do not mention the impact
of monetary interventions on the market (in)stability, which is
beyond the scope of the present analysis.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
we extend the economic assumptions that underline the model
in a dynamical systems framework stressing how this generalizes previous work. In section 3, we introduce the definition of
contagion, which is the most original contribution of this paper.
Further, in section 4 we analyse the mechanism of instability
contagion for three common scenarios. In the appendices we
recall and adapt previously established constructs to the present
situation.

banks and the government. We consider investors as portfolio managers dealing with both domestic and foreign clients,
therefore assume that they interact with agents domiciled in
all countries. Consistently with Choi and Douady (2013), we
call these five aggregates ‘agents.’ To distinguish the domestic
agents of different countries, we use superscripts which match
the notation of the economy under consideration. Thus, for
economy i, we have the following five agents:
Ci
Fi
Bi
Gi
Ii

Consumers (the general public)
Firms (producers of goods and services, corporations)
Banks (lenders in general)
Government (the public authority in general, but
excluding the central bank)
Investors (asset managers such as pension and other
funds) restricted to economy i§

In Choi and Douady (2012, 2013) the central bank and the
government were classified as one agent because they consistently coordinate their emergency interventions. In this article, however, we separate the two on the grounds of their
distinct balance sheets and natures of their policy tools.¶ In
the present instantiation of our model, we consider central
banks as super-systemic agents that monitor and intervene
on the global economic system to prevent instability. Other
versions of the model can encapsulate central banks as new
agents if necessary—for example to monitor their economic
and financial role during and after a financial crisis.
These agents interact through cash flows, of which the data
can be found in the flow of funds accounts. Within a country,
the cash flow are divided into two groups by their nature,
whether they are at-will (variable) or scheduled. The following
are typical examples of flow of funds in each category: 1–4 for
at-will cash flows; 5–8 for scheduled ones.
(1) Equity investment
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

2. Assumptions on economies
We adopt the multi-agent model (Choi and Douady 2012, 2013)
and keep the same assumptions on the economy. Details can
be found in appendix A.1, where we focus on the features
necessary to extend the previous model to a system of multiple
economies.

(2) Debt investment (Loan)
(a)

(b)

2.1. Flow of funds among economic agents
The goal of this article is to model a sovereign credit crisis and
related systemic risk, so we consider the economies of multiple
sovereign nations. We extend the five agent (n = 5 in the
above notation) model proposed by Choi and Douady (2013)
to s economies.‡ We represent the economy of each country as
the interaction of four domestic aggregates: consumers, firms,
†We assume all wealth is rescaled with respect to a base year by a
deflator.
‡Hence this model specializes to Choi and Douady’s (2013) for s = 1.

Ci to Ci : consumers invest in houses and other
goods, and sell those to one another
Fi to Fi : companies invest in each other
Ii to Bi and Fi : investors buy bank and corporations
stocks
Gi to Bi and Fi : the government acts as an investor
Bi to Ci : home mortgage, credit cards and other
financing
Bi to Bi : interbank lending, market for securitized
assets
Bi to Fi : bank loans to companies
Ii to Gi , Bi and Fi : investors buy bonds issued by
Gi , Bi and Fi

(3) Dividends and Distributions
(a)
(b)

Bi and Fi to I: investors earn dividends from the
B and F stocks
Ii to Ci : investors pay distributions to their clients

(4) Consumption
§By ‘investors restricted to economy i’, we mean the part of the global
I that manages the flow of funds from and to economy i.
¶A difference that is all the more significant in the Eurozone.
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Ci and Fi to Fi : consumers and companies buy
goods and services
Gi to Fi : the government buys goods and services,
launches expense programmes

(5) Coupons
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

Ci to Bi : mortgage and other financing payments,
credit card debt payments
Bi to Bi and Ii : coupons for MBS and ABS and
other fixed income securities, also included are
CDS premiums
Fi to Bi and Ii : companies pay coupons to the bond
holders
Gi to Ii and Bi : coupons of government bonds
such as the US Treasury bonds, German Bunds
and British Gilts

(6) Salary, pension: Bi , Fi , Ii and Gi to Ci
(7) Contributions (e.g. pension fund): Ci to Ii
(8) Tax: Ci , Fi , Bi , Ii to Gi
A third category of cash flows is neither at will, nor scheduled, but contingent, in the sense that they are mandatory and
their level depends on the state of certain economic variables
at specific points in or periods of time (often, but not necessarily, prescribed at the inception of the corresponding contract).
Most notable examples are quantitative easing (central bank’s
buying the government’s debt, so Gi to Gi if the central bank
is grouped with the government, or increase in money supply
in the system with an invisible source if it is considered supersystemic) and derivative pay-off, such as CDS payouts in case
of a credit event (Bi to Bi , Ii ). Figure 1 is an illustration of the
cash flows among agents.
When a pair of economies i and j interact in an international
market, there are cash flows between agents from each country
in addition to the ones above:
(9) International investment
(a)
(b)

Bi to/from Bj : interbank lending and investment
Bi to/from Gj : Bi invests in Gj ’s bonds and Gj pays
Bi interest and principal.

(10) International consumption and trade
(a)
(b)

Ci to Fj : direct consumption by Ci of goods and
services produced by Fj , such as tourism
Fi to/from Fj : companies do business one another,
such as import and export

Figure 2. Cash flows between domestic agents of economy i and j.
The supernational I interacts with all agents from economies i and j.

In the above classification, we consider foreign branches of
a parent company as part of the economy where the branch is
domiciled. For example, suppose company A is headquartered
and registered in country i and has a branch in country j, then
the branch is part of Fj and its local employees are part of Cj .
The consumption of company A’s goods and service by Cj is
considered as a cash flow from Cj to Fj , and not to Fi , even
when the consumed goods are produced in country i, for they
will be imported by the company’s local branch in country j.
The import/export cash flows between the headquarter and the
local branch are considered as a trade between Fi and Fj . On the
other hand, if tourists from country i spend money in country
j, then it is a direct consumption of goods produced by Fj
by Ci .
Lending at private level is treated the same manner. If consumers or firms in country i borrow money from a bank of
country j through its branch in i, then the cash flow here is Bi
to Ci or Bi to Fi . However, at sovereign level, we assume only
direct lending between banks and the governments, hence if the
government of country i sells bonds to a bank headquartered in
country j, then it is a cash flow from Bj to Gi , whether the local
branch of the bank in country i is involved in the transaction
or not.
Private investment is classified in the same manner. If consumers in country i invest in securities of corporations in
country j (here i is not necessarily different from j), then
there are two cash flows involved, one between Ci and Ii , and
the other between Ij and Fj . This assumption implies that even
within one economy, consumers invest in other agents through
asset managers. Note that there exist private investment from
Ci to Cj , such as investment in real estate and other goods, but
they are not significant compared with other cash flows, so we
ignore them and assume there is no interaction between Ci and
Cj for i = j.
Figure 2 is an illustration of the cash flows between agents.
There are many other kinds of cash flows and our selection
is just representative ones. Nevertheless, it would be enough
to explain the interactions economic agents which is a key
component of our construction and analysis of a dynamical
system of wealth.

3. Spreading financial risk: contagion
3.1. Intuition for contagion

Figure 1. Combined cash flows among five agents in economy i.

A qualitative definition of financial contagion is not hard to
formulate. For example, one could define financial contagion
as the dynamics, whereby a crisis in a given economic system
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(e.g. a country) spreads to other systems. Among the most
recent examples, we would like to point out the current
Eurozone sovereign credit crisis as well as the 2007–2009+
US credit crisis.
To investigate the spread of credit and economic distress
within the conceptual framework laid out in the previous section, we divide Eurozone countries into two groups, Group
1 of fiscally weaker economies in the periphery that have
experienced the sovereign debt crisis, e.g. Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Cyprus and possibly Spain, and Italy, and Group
2 of their creditor countries, i.e. the home countries of the
banks which are heavily exposed to the sovereign debts of the
former. Consider a peripheral economy i (e.g. Greece) and a
creditor economy j (e.g. France). The main way in which the
‘Eurozone contagion’ is taking place is through the perception
that the sovereign of economy i cannot fulfil its obligation to
the banks of economy j, i.e. that the cash flow from Gi to
Bj falls below its obligatory level. In such a event, the equity
level of Bj would plunge and it is very likely that several banks
would experience bank runs or even go bankrupt. This can
trigger a severe economic instability or even a financial crisis
in economy j (figure 3).
Once this happens, there can be a further contagion to the
rest of the world (outside the Eurozone) which we call Group
3. Consider an economy k whose banks are the major counterparties of Bj (e.g. the US). Troubles in Bj affects the credit
conditions of not only other banks in the Eurozone but also
of Bk , which would drastically reduce lending in both the
financial and real sectors of the relevant economy. This could
lead to a global credit crunch and subsequent shrinkage of the
global economy, similar to the crisis that ensued from Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy, but far greater in magnitude (figure 4).
Difficulties immediately arise when one attempts to formulate a definition of contagion that would adequately model the
scenario outlined above. Here are a few questions it is natural
to ask (cf. also Karolyi 2003)
(a) How does one detect a crisis in an economic system?
(b) How does one determine causation between one crisis
and another? Is succession in time sufficient?
Below, we will address these questions along with a quantitative definition of contagion within our dynamical systems
framework. To do so, we will devote the next section to establishing a dynamical systems of the wealth of the global market
economy.

Figure 3. Contagion of financial crisis from a debtor economy i to
a creditor economy j.

Figure 4. Contagion spilled to outside of the Eurozone, from
economy j to its non-Eurozone counterparty k.

3.2. Dynamical system of wealth for multiple economies
In this section, we extend the multi-agent dynamic model for a
single economy proposed by Choi and Douady (2012, 2013) to
a system of multiple economies. Their results and mathematical
details are summarized in appendix A.1, and in this section we
use them with only necessary modifications.
In order to generalize that framework is sufficient enough
to accommodate the joint modelling of multiple economic
systems, we slightly modify the underlying assumptions as follows. Our model assumes a continuous-time dynamical system
(X, f )
f : R × X −→ X
(1)
(t, x) −→ f t (x)
where R thereby acts as a group on the group of endomorphisms of X . For the rest of this article we will assume that X ⊂
Rn ,† that it is open and connected, and the action is continuous
and differentiable up to a set of isolated points‡ S so that, in
particular, the maps f t admit Jacobians everywhere except for
S. At every x ∈ S, the differentiability is relaxed to admit only
left and right partial derivatives. Further, we assume that M̄ ⊂
X , where M̄ is the set of feasible wealths (cf. appendix A.1). To
model the partition of the global system into subeconomies, we
also assume such system can be decomposed into the product
of s factors, namely (cf. Brin and Stuck (2003, Sec. 1.1)),


s
f = sk=1 f k : R × sk=1 X k →
k=1 X k
(t, x1 , . . . xs ) → ( f 1t (x1 ), . . . , f st (xs ))
(2)
Each factor space X k is a subset of Rn k , X k ⊂ Rn k .§ Most of
our study will be focusing on orbits of the dynamical system of
wealths. Such an orbit will be denoted with f t (x0 ) = w(t0 +t),

†If more attention needs to be devoted to the orbit topology or similar
problems, one may let X be a topological or smooth manifold.
‡The topology on X is that induced by the standard Euclidean one
generated by n-dimensional balls.
§Note that the X k ’s will be also open and connected, which follows
from the openness of the canonical projections.
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where the initial point x0 = w(t0 ), is left unspecified.† The
components of the orbit are denoted as f kt (x0 ) = wk (t0 + t).‡
Finally, since most of our attention is devoted to discrete orbits,
we clarify that these are obtained by canonically embedding the
integers into the reals, Z → R, that is, a discrete dynamical
system is obtained by considering f (c, x) = f c (x) and the
corresponding factors for all c ∈ Z.
In our model, the evolution of the financial market is the
forward orbit { f t (w(t0 ))}t>0 of w(t0 ) for some t0 , market
equilibria are the fixed points of f , and a financial crisis§
is a propagation of a negative wealth shock throughout the
system. When an agent, say i, experiences an abrupt change
wi (a shock) on its wealth, the original dynamical system f
is perturbed to produce a new one. The scope of wi induces
a one-parameter family of maps { f μ }, and the leverage of
agent i determines the size of the perturbation: if its leverage is small enough, then f μ stays close to f ¶; if too big,
then some equilibria may not withstand the perturbation and
their stability types change, i.e. a bifurcation has taken place.
All agents are interconnected via cash flows, and a negative
wealth shock on a highly leveraged agent spreads to others,
lowering the wealth level of all agents. Therefore w(t), which
used to be in the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium
p of f , now repels away from an unstable equilibrium pμ
of f μ . Because of the compactness of M̄, the forward orbit
{ f μt (w(t0 ))}t>0 would eventually enter the basin of attraction
of another stable equilibrium, say qμ , that represents much
lower wealth level than p for all agents. In financial terms this
means that the market has entered a recession and the wealth
levels of all agents do not go up without an intervention by
monetary (and quite often fiscal as well) authorities. Thus, the
monetary intervention by authorities is to perturb the dynamical system to break the stable equilibrium qμ and create an
instability. The subspace N of the phase space X of f that
corresponds to an ideal economy, i.e. where the authorities
want the wealth w(t) to be,†† is locally invariant, f (N ) ⊂ N ,
therefore dynamic instability within N necessarily produces a
chaotic behaviour. At a stable equilibrium, the Jacobian matrix
d f has all eigenvalues absolute value less than 1 and the same
is true for points in its basin of attraction. This the rationale
why the market instability indicator I (t) (Choi and Douady
2012) is defined as the spectral radius of the Jacobian matrix
of the dynamical system of wealth.
We consider a collection of s economies such that the economy k is divided into n k aggregates which we call ‘economic
agent’. The number of economies s and those of the agents may
differ from case to case. In our Eurozone example in section
†This could be interpreted as the wealth in a base year as for many
other macroeconomic variables.
‡Unless otherwise specified, we take our base year to be the origin
of time, t0 = 0. Accordingly, we will write w(t) and wk (t) for the
generic elements of a global and component orbit, respectively.
§This term is applied broadly to a variety of situations in which some
financial assets suddenly lose a large part of their nominal value
(Wikipedia 2005).
¶We use the C 0 -topology on X defined by d0,X ( f, g) = sup{ | f (x)−
g(x)| | x ∈ X } for some metric | · | on X .
Usually wealth appreciation slows down after an exuberant growth
phase (bubble phase), so we can assume p is stable.
††Hence this N is a subset of M̄, the set of feasible wealths, mentioned
above and in appendix A.1.
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2.1, n k = 5 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ s while s was not specified. At
n
each time t, we observe w(t) = (w1 (t), . . . , wn (t))
s∈ R ,
the global wealth vector of the agents where n = k=1 n k .
More precisely, w(t) is a canonical embedding of the respective wealth vector of each economy, w k (t) = (w k1 (t),
w k2 (t), . . . , w kn k (t)), where w kj (t) is the wealth of agent j of
economy k at time t. Therefore wi (t) = w kj (t) if
i = N (k) + j,

N (k) =

k−1


nl

(3)

l=1

As a result, wi (t) for each i inherits the equity–debt wealth
decomposition of w kj (t) such that
wi (t) = E i (t) + Di (t) = E kj (t) + D kj (t)

(4)

and the liquidity-invested asset decomposition
wi (t) = L i (t) + K i (t) = L kj (t) + K kj (t)

(5)

The results of appendix A.1 apply to multi-economic system
as well, yet we need to make some modification to accommodate the differentiable dynamical system we are considering.
The original ‘elasticity coefficient’ (Choi and Douady 2012,
2013) was defined to be ‡‡:
∂ Fi j
ai j =
(6)
∂w j
or equivalently,
Fi j (t) = ai j (t)w j (t)

(7)

for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, including j = i. This definition assumes
the existence of the partial derivative regardless of the sign of
the wealth shock w j , and works well when analysing the default mechanism of agents on the brink of and during a financial
crisis. But on other occasions we can observe discontinuities
of elasticity coefficients.§§ This is graphically illustrated in
figure 5.
For our differentiable dynamical system, we will need onesided elasticity coefficient as follows to accommodate this
problem¶¶:
‡‡In Choi and Douady (2012, 2013) the differentiability of f was not
∂ Fi j
Fi j
specified but
was used in the sense of
. In appendix A.1
∂w j
w j
is specifically mentioned that f is piecewise linear, and the elasticity
Fi j
.
ai j is defined to be
w j
§§For example, when major US banks were bailed out after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the following credit crunch, the
lending to consumers and firms did not increase as much as the policymakers expected, for the banks hoarded cash instead of lending.
Another example is the prevalent high unemployment rate: when
firms’ wealth decrease, they compensate it by laying off employees,
however they are reluctant to hire people even when their profits
go up. This behaviour was observed even during the bubble time:
when consumers had extra disposable income due to house price
appreciation and wage increase for example, they did not make more
debt reimbursement than needed or increase savings. They instead
spent the money on goods and services, increasing the cash flows
C to F. When the bubble burst, many people could not pay-off their
mortgage and other debt payments, thus the cash flows from C to B
decreased.
¶¶Recall that we relaxed the differentiability condition on the set of
isolated points S ⊂ X . The introduction of these lateral elasticities
further specifies this condition.
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agent j of economy l to agent i of economy k at time t by
F iklj (t), which is in terms of the global system can be written
as†
(15)
F kl
i j (t) = FN (k)+i,N (l)+ j (t)
Therefore, we get the elasticity a iklj (t) for discrete f as




F iklj w lj (t) + w lj (t) − F iklj w lj (t)
a iklj (t) =
w lj
=

Figure 5. When the wealth w j (t) falls below the target wealth
w j,0 (t), the cash outflow Fi j (t) from j to i decreases, but it stays
flat when w j (t) > w j,0 (t).
⎧
Fi j (w j (t) + w j (t)) − Fi j (w j (t))
+
⎪
⎪
⎨ ai j (t) = limw j (t)→0+
w (t)
j

Fi j (w j (t) + w j (t)) − Fi j (w j (t))
⎪
⎪
⎩ ai−j (t) = limw j (t)→0−
w j (t)
(8)

if w j (t) > 0
if w j (t) < 0

(9)

Depending on the context we choose an appropriate onesided limit as the elasticity and write ai j (t) without the sign.
Like the case of a single economy, the entries of the Jacobian
matrix bi j are related to the elasticities ai j of the dynamical
system as follows (see also equations (58) and (59)):
⎛
⎞

ak j ⎠
(10)
bi j = ai j + δi j ⎝1 −

(16)

w lj (t)

where w lj (t) is the wealth of the jth agent in the lth economy.
The elasticities for continuous f can be obtained by taking
one-sided limits of equation (16) as w lj (t) → 0.

In a global economy with n = sk=1 n k agents, the wealth
of each agent is defined using the cash flows between all n
agents,
wi (t + 1) = wi (t) +

n

j=1

or equivalently,
Fi j (t) = ai+j (t)w j (t)
Fi j (t) = ai−j (t)w j (t)

F iklj (t)

Fi j (t) −

n


Fki (t),

(17)

k=1
k =i

and this wealth level is inherited by each subeconomy. In other
words, we do not use only the agents in a subeconomy to
calculate the wealths of agents in that subeconomy. As a result,
the wi (t) in equation (17) is used to calculate the local elasticity
matrix A( k) (t) and local Jacobian matrix B ( k) (t) as well as the
global elasticity matrix A(t) and global Jacobian matrix B(t).
Therefore, we have the following canonical embedding of local
matrices into the global ones:

k= j

which in matrix form reads
B = A + I − A
(11)



where A = diag
k=1 ak1 ,
k=2 ak2 , . . .
k=n akn .
We extend the indexing in equation (3) to show how the
global system and individual economies are related, and indeed
the individual subsystem can be naturally embedded into the
global system.
The cash flow Fi j (t) moves from agent j to i at time t. When
the agents belong to the same economy, say k, and we need to
focus on that particular economy, we specify it by an upper
index:
(12)
FN (k)+i,N (k)+ j (t) = F ikj (t)


and

We do the same thing for the Jacobian matrix and elasticity
matrix:
(13)
b N (k)+i,N (k)+ j (t) = b kij (t)
and
(14)
a N (k)+i,N (k)+ j (t) = a ikj (t)


where B (k) (t) = b kij (t) is the Jacobian matrix of economy k


and A( k) (t) = a ikj (t) is the elasticity matrix of economy k.
To track the interaction between agents from different
economies, we use both upper index (for the economy) and
lower index (for agents). Thus, we denote the cash flow from

†Notice that not to overburden notation we have not adopted the
double superscripts for a single economy, so that we are implicitly
k
defining F ikk
j (t) = FN (k)+i,N (k)+ j (t) = F i j (t). A similar stylistic
remark applies to the elasticity and Jacobian matrices.
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where



A (kl) (t) = a iklj (t) 1≤i≤nk .

(20)

1≤ j≤nl

3.3. Quantitative definition of contagion
When modelling an economic system through theories of dynamical systems, Choi and Douady (2012) introduced a market
instability indicator, namely the spectral radius of the Jacobian
matrix of the wealth dynamical system. In symbols this market
instability indicator can be defined as
I (t) := ρ (B(w(t)))

of the time interval from our definition in case the Jacobian
matrix evolves continuously.
Remark 3.3 The definition of i-contagion applies to a system of economies from different currency zones by converting
the cash flows to a major currency such the US dollar or the
Euro. It can also be used to investigate contagion in a single
economy by considering partitions of agents as subsystems.
The next section provides more details about this i-contagion
in a single economy.
4. Mechanism of instability contagion

(21)

where ρ(M) denotes the spectral radius of a matrix M ∈ Rn×n ,
and B is the Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system f at w(t).
(See appendix A.2 for details.)
Note that this indicator is an early warning system of a
financial crisis, viz., a given economic system is liable to enter
a crisis iff I (t) > 1 (cf. also Hollo et al. 2012).†
Consistently with the above observations, we assume that
for contagion to take place it is necessary that
B(t) = ⊕sk=1 B (k) (t),

1249

(22)

i.e. B(t) is not a block-diagonal matrix, for otherwise a given
system would be insensitive to any other. The reducibility of
the global Jacobian matrix to a direct sum of its constituent’s
subsystems can be regarded as an analogue of the independence
of random risk factors. In order to account for the dynamic
feature of contagion (i.e. the fact that a system passes from a
state of normalcy to one of crisis), we demand that initially
no instability is observed at the local (subsystemic) as well as
global level. Then at least one of the subsystems enters a state
of crisis, finally, at yet another time, instability propagates to
the entire system, and this occurs when the transmission of risk
is possible, i.e. the Jacobian matrix is not totally reducible to
its components. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 3.1 (i-Contagion) We say that the contagion of
financial instability, or i-contagion, in a global economic system occurs if given two time instants t0 , t1 with 0 < t0 < t1 ,‡
one has
(i) At time t < t0 , maxk ρ(B (k) (t)) < 1 and ρ(B(t)) < 1.
(ii) At time t ∈ (t0 , t1 ), maxk ρ(B (k) (t)) > 1 and
ρ(B(t)) < 1.
(iii) At time t > t1 B(t) = ⊕sk=1 B (k) (t) and ρ(B(t)) > 1.
Remark 3.1 The last condition in the definition is meant to
model the causal feature of contagion, that is, the fact that a
global crisis ensues from risk transmission from one subsystem
to another. We rule out simultaneous crises that are unrelated.
Notice that when B(t) = ⊕sk=1 B (k) (t) one has ρ(B(t)) =
maxk ρ(B (k) (t)), hence without the last condition a global
crisis could arise from the independent occurrence of subsystemic crises.
Remark 3.2
Since we chose to leave stability undetermined
for a spectral radius precisely equal to 1, we omit the end point

In this section, we will study the contagion of instability in different settings. For all cases we will use the well-known result
that the trace of a square matrix is the sum of its eigenvalues:
n

tr (M) =
λi ,
(23)
i=1

which implies

|tr (M)|
≤ max |λi | = ρ(M)
(24)
λi ∈σ (M)
n
where σ (M) denotes the spectrum of M. Applying this to
equation (10), we get the following lower bound of the market
instability indicator I (t) = ρ(B(t)),




n




1
1
1 +
(25)
aii (t) −
ai j (t) ≤ ρ(B)

n
n


i= j
i=1

When an agent is highly leveraged, a sudden negative shock on
its wealth can affect the outgoing cash flow of the agent, and
as we witnessed during the US subprime crisis, the financial
distress can transmit across both the real and financial sectors
within an economy, eventually leading to a financial crisis. This
kind of instability contagion may happen cross-border, and this
is the main concern about the Eurozone sovereign credit crisis.
We will show that the sign and size of the diagonal entries
of the Jacobian matrix of the wealth dynamical system play a
crucial role in the emergence of an instability contagion.
First, we start with a lemma that can be applied to both
growth phase and crisis period of an economy.
Lem m a 4.1 Let f : I → R be a function defined on an open
set U ⊂ R and assume its first derivative exists on an interval
I ⊂ U and select t0 and t1 from I with t0 < t1 , then
(a) If f is strictly increasing or strictly decreasing, then
f (t1 )
f (t0 ) > 0
(c) If f is strictly decreasing and concave,

Proof (a): Throughout we pick an arbitrary θ > 0 such that
t + θ stays in I . If f is increasing in t, then both f (t) and
)
f (t + θ ) are positive. Hence f f(t+θ
(t) > 0. If f is decreasing
in t, then both f (t) and f (t + θ ) are negative, which yields
the same result.
(b) and (c): If f is increasing and convex, then f (t + θ ) >
)
f (t) > 0, hence f f(t+θ
(t) > 1. If f is decreasing and concave,
then f (t + θ ) < f (t) < 0, hence

†The behaviour of an economic system with spectral radius precisely
equal to 1 is left undefined.
‡We assume the origin of time in our model is 0.

f (t1 )
f (t0 ) > 1
then ff (t(t10 )) > 1

(b) If f is strictly increasing and convex, then

f (t+θ )
f (t)

> 1.



The convexity for the increasing case is to model the accelerating wealth of (some) agents, which can be observed
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during a growth phase, whereas the concave decreasing case
can model a crisis period when the wealth level decreases with
acceleration. We will use the decreasing case repeatedly to
establish a lower bound of the market instability indicator on
the brink of or during a financial crisis.

4.1. Contagion within an economy
Consider a 5-agent model with consumers (C), firms (F), banks
(B), government (G) and investors (I). The central bank is
considered as a super-systemic agent and excluded from the
system.† The wealth of agent i is
wi (t + 1) = wi (t) +

5

j=1

Fi j (t) −

5


Fki (t)

(26)

k=i

where Fi j is a cash inflow from j to i (e.g. investment, wage)
and −Fki is a cash outflow from i to k (e.g. consumption,
withdrawal). Often this Fi j is a voluntary, at-will investment
while −Fki is necessary or required expenditure. Assume that
consumers are highly leveraged, i.e. borrowed heavily using
their invested assets K 1 as collateral when it was appreciating
rapidly.‡ Further assume that the growth of K 1 passed its peak
and K 1 has been declining. We make the same assumption
for w1 .
∂w1 (t + 1)
=
By Lemma 4.1 and chain rule, b11 (t) =
∂w1 (t)
w1 (t + 1)
> 0 where the prime means differentiating with
w1 (t)
respect to time t. If w1 (t) is concave in t as well, then b11 (t) > 1
by Lemma 4.1 part (c). The size of the cash outflow from 1 to
other agents gives further information on the lower bound of
the spectral radius of the Jacobian, i.e. the market instability
indicator.

∂ Fk1 (t)
.
Recall that b11 = 1+a11 − 5k=2 ak1 and ak1 (t) =
∂w1 (t)
As the wealth of consumers decreases, the outgoing cash flow
may change accordingly as the following analysis suggests:
(a) a21 : F21 is what consumers should pay to firms, i.e. consumption. As consumers’ wealth decreases consumption goes down as well, but it will level soon because
there are basic expenditures. Hence a21 becomes almost
0 eventually.
(b) a31 : F31 is consumers’ loan payment including interests
and fees.§ When consumers’ wealth decreases so does
the value of the collateral used to take the loan, hence the
payment F31 increases. Delinquent loans will increase
the interest and penalty to make F31 increase even more.
Therefore a31 < 0.
(c) a41 : F41 is consumers’tax paid to the government. When
consumers’ wealth decreases, their tax, which consists
mostly of income tax and property tax, to the government decreases. This implies a41 > 0.
†One can see that, as a contagion develops, the economy indeed needs
a super-systemic intervention to avoid a total collapse.
‡This was the case of the US, Spain and Ireland at the peak of their
respective real estate bubbles.
§Consumers’ investment in banks (deposit) is represented by the offdiagonal element a31 = b31 of B.

(d) a51 : F51 is what consumers are obliged to pay the investors.¶ Since investors function to consumers as portfolio managers rather than lenders, there is no particular
change in F51 . This implies a51 ∼ 0.
The figures in figure 6 show representative relations between
Fk1 and w1 (t).
Then
b11 = 1 + a11 − a21 − a31 − a41 − a51

(27)

≈ 1 + a11 − 0 − a31 − a41 − 0

(28)

= 1 + a11 − a31 − a41 .

(29)

As defined in equation (57) a11 =
equation (42),
a11 (t) =

∂(γ1 (t)K 1 (t))
, and by
∂w1 (t)

˜ (t)
K 1 (t + 1) − K 1 (t) − K
i
.
w1 (t)

(30)

If K 1 (t) is decreasing and concave in t, then K i (t +1) < K i (t).
˜ 1 (t) of liquidity L 1 (t) to invested assets
The conversion K
K 1 (t) would be negative at the beginning since consumers
would liquidate their invested assets to make increased payments to banks, but there is a limit to doing so and it will level
˜ (t) ∼ 0. Hence, the numerator of
off eventually. Therefore K
i
equation (30) is negative, and the denominator w (t) is negative
by our assumption, so a11 (t) > 0. In equation (27), a31 and a41
are of the opposite sign, yet the debt payment to banks tends to
increase faster than the tax savings due to decreased wealth. As
a result, if both w1 (t) and K 1 (t) are decreasing and concave,
b11 (t) is not only greater than 1, but its size is pushed up as
|a31 (t)| increases.
By equation (24) the market instability indicator ρ(B(t))
|tr (B(t))|
, and a large b11 alone does
is bounded below by
n
not guarantee that the indicator goes above 1. Yet when we
partition the economy into two groups, Consumers-Banks
(Partition 1) and Firm-Government-Investors (Partition 2), the
lower bound of Partition 1’s market instability indicator
|b11 + b33 |
ρ(B (1) (t)) is
and it is very possible that a large b11
2
can make the lower bound greater than 1 regardless of the size
of b33 , making ρ (1) (B(t)) > 1 while ρ(B(t)) < 1. This does
not automatically imply a financial crisis in the entire economy,
though.As long as consumers can make loan payments to banks
despite decreased wealth, Partition 1 will maintain an unstable
equilibrium. However, if they mass default on their payments,
hence the wealth w3 of banks gets reduced, there can be a
contagion of instability from Partition 1 to the entire economy.
The diagonal entry of banks is
b33 = 1 + a33 − a13 − a23 − a43 − a53 .

(31)

The elasticities a13 , a23 and a53 are related to consumers’,
firms’, and investors’withdrawal from banks, F13 , F23 and F53 ,

¶Like bank deposit, consumers’ investment is represented by the offdiagonal a51 .
The dynamics of K i is defined to be discrete in equation (42),
and when we assume continuous f , equations (41)–(43) should be
modified accordingly. Since the mechanism of instability contagion
is our main focus in this article, we leave out the mathematical details
on the dynamics of Di , K i and L i in continuous case.

Financial instability contagion
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(a) Change of F21 with respect to w1

(b) Change of F31 with respect to w1

(c) Change of F41 with respect to w1

(d) Change of F51 with respect to w1

Figure 6. Representative cash outflows from agent 1 as functions of its wealth.

respectively, and are negative in sign since those withdrawals
increase as the banks’ wealth decreases (and sometimes leads
to a bank run). The only positive element in equation (31) is
a43 which is related to the tax paid to the government. Once
the banks’ asset started to fall due to a mass delinquency by
their debtors, its decline accelerates, i.e. w3 (t) < 0. If loan
delinquency continues, very likely the banks’ invested asset
K 3 (t) that includes all debt writedowns becomes decreasing
and concave in t, and as is the case of consumers, liquidating
invested assets has a limit, hence a33 > 0. Even if K 3 (t) is not
concave, the size of |a13 |, |a23 |, and |a53 | can push up b33 .†
At this stage the economy could be in a state of financial crisis
and other agents’ wealths have been declining as well. Hence
bii > 0 for all i = 3, so it is very possible that the market
instability indicator ρ(B(t)) becomes greater than 1.
As was mentioned in the case of consumers, as long as banks
manage to pay their interbank loan payments and continue
lending at normal level despite their wealth reduction, the economy will maintain an unstable equilibrium, but in reality, at this
stage many banks would have a serious liquidity problems and
may face bankruptcy. This is indeed the case of Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers. With or without bankruptcy, severe
credit squeeze, represented by decreased bi3 = ai3 in the offdiagonal of B(t), would be inevitable as banks reduce lending. Reduced credit means reduced operating cost for firms,
†These elasticities are stochastic, but their probability distributions
depend on the specific economy under consideration.

which leads to mass lay-off of workforce and eventually mass
bankruptcy. This would result in severe reduction of wealth
and cash flows of every agent, a total collapse of the economy.
This is contagion of instability to the entire economy. It was at
this stage during the US subprime crisis that the government
and the central bank stepped in to bailout banks and started
various monetary policies and operations some of which still
continue to date (Wikipedia 2008).
4.2. Contagion within multiple economies
4.2.1. Contagion by default. Now we investigate contagion in more than one economies. We consider two economies
only, for more economies can be dealt with in a similar manner.
Consider two economies 1 and 2, each of which is modelled
with the same five agents as in section 4.1. We index the agents
as in equation (3), hence consumers in Economy 2 is assigned
6, firms 7, banks 8, government 9 and investors 10.
Assume that the government of Economy 1 (agent 4) has
difficulty in paying back loans to the banks in Economy 2
(agent 8). The diagonal entry of agent 4 is
b44 = 1 + a44 −

10


ak4 .

(32)

k=4

The elasticities −a14 , −a24 , −a64 , −a74 , −a94 and −a10,4
are related to −F14 , −F24 , −F64 , −F74 , −F94 and −F10,4 ,
respectively, which are the money that consumers and firms
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of Economy 1, consumers, firms, government and investors†
of Economy 2 ‘take’ from the government of Economy 1, and
are almost zero. Thus, −a14 , −a24 , −a64 , −a74 , −a94 , and
−a10,4 are almost zero. The remaining terms in equation (32)
are −a34 , −a54 , and −a84 which are related to the obligatory
payments of the government of Economy 1 to its banks and
investors, and the banks in Economy 2, respectively. As shown
in section 4.1, the loan payment of an agent increases as its
wealth decreases. So a34 , a54 , and a84 are all negative and
large in magnitude. When the government has trouble in paying
back its loans, the other agents in the economy are very likely
to have experienced wealth decrease, therefore bii > 0 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ 5. This means that very likely the local instability
indicator ρ(B (1) (t)) > 1.
If the government of Economy 1 indeed defaults on its
payment to the banks of Economy 2, then the wealth of agent
8 is reduced and many of its panicked investors would take out
their investment, possibly causing a bank run. Then, the same
analysis as in section 4.1 applies to show that ρ(B (2) (t)) could
go above 1. The global instability indicator ρ(B(t)) is bounded
|tr (B(t))|
and if bii for i = 8 are all positive or some
below by
n
are negative but small in absolute value compared with b88 ,‡
then very likely the global instability indicator ρ(B(t)) would
go above 1. By definition the contagion of instability from
Economy 1 to the global economy has taken place.
This cross-economy contagion analysis can be applied to
model the current Eurozone sovereign credit crisis. Default by
the governments of peripheral economies would cause serious
write-offs for banks in creditor countries that could eventually
cause bank runs and credit freeze. However, unlike the case
of the US subprime crisis, the Eurozone governments do not
have the power to implement monetary policies on their own.
This problem has been in the center of the crisis and how to
resolve it is still under debate.

4.2.2. Contagion by fear factor. Now we add a third economy, Economy 3, to the global system mentioned in the previous section. Assume that there is no interaction between
Economy 1 and Economy 3, and the banks in Economy 2 have
invested in the sovereign debt of both Economies 1 and 3. Since
we add five more agents from Economy 3 we need to use the
following equation to recalculate the wealth wi (t) for all 15
agents in the three economies,
wi (t + 1) = wi (t) =

15

j=1

Fi j (t) −

15


Fki (t)

(33)

k=i

and the Jacobian matrix B(t) and the elasticity matrix A(t)
should be recalculated using the new wealth. Yet the wealth
wi (t) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, the local Jacobian matrix B (1) (t), and
elasticity matrix A (1) (t) remain unchanged because there is no
interaction between Economies 1 and 3 by assumption.
†Recall that the investors are an international entity, and when we
consider a single economy, we consider the part restricted to that
economy. Therefore, investors in Economy 2—agent 10—interacts
only with agents in Economy 2.
‡It is very probable that the diagonal entries of B (1) (t) are still high
due to high the leverage of the agents in Economy 1.

Suppose the government of Economy 1 (agent 1) was eventually bailed out by international monetary authorities and their
loans from the banks in Economy 2 (agent 8) have been restructured, and its local market instability indicator ρ(B (1) (t))
is now less than 1. We further assume that the market fears
that the government of Economy 3 (agent 14), although it
currently is not going through any macroeconomic change,
is following the path of Economy 1 and may cause another
round of loan restructuring and write-offs. This fear would
drive up the yield of the government bond of Economy 3 to a
very high level. It was at this stage in the Eurozone sovereign
credit crisis when the European Central Bank (ECB) stepped
in: after the government bond yield of Spain and Italy rose to an
unsustainable level, the ECB President Mario Draghi pledged
that the ECB was ready to do ‘whatever it takes’ to preserve the
Euro (The Financial Times 2012). After this announcement the
market calmed down and the Spanish and Italian yields went
back to a sustainable level.
However, we want to investigate what would happen if the
sovereign bond yield of an economy remains high and its government cannot borrow enough at an affordable rate. Assume
that the banks of Economy 2 (agent 8), the banks and investors
of Economy 3 (agent 13 and 15, respectively) indeed reduce
their lending to agent 14. This means reduced cash flows F14,8 ,
F14,13 , F14,15 in equation (33) for i = 14. The government
bond yield is a lower bound of other domestic interest rates,
so the consumers and firms in Economy 3 (agent 11 and 12,
respectively) have to pay higher interest on their loans. This
means lower consumption and productivity, and eventually
a lower tax revenue to the government which is represented
by reduced F14,11 and F14,12 in equation (33) for i = 14.
hence w14 (t) < 0. On the other hand, the government’s
payment to its lenders increase due to higher interest rate,
which means aki < 0 for i = 14 and k = 8, 13, 15. Troubled
real sector could result in unemployment and bankruptcies,
so the government’s benefit payment to consumers and firms
would go up, which means aki < 0 for i = 14 and k =
11, 12. The diagonal element b14,14 is formulated as (recall the
assumption on no interaction between Economies 1 and 3)

b14,14 = 1 + a14,14 −

15


ak,14 = 1 + a14,14 −

i=1
i =14

15


ak,14 (34)

i=6
i =14

and ak,14 = 0 for k = 6, 7, 9, 10 since there is hardly any
payment obligation from the government of Economy 3 to the
consumers, firms, government and investors of Economy 2,
respectively. By Lemma 4.1 b14,14
 > 0 and is very likely to
be big due to the magnitude of 15i=6 ak,14 . Also by the same
i =14

Lemma, it is very possible that bii > 0 for all other agents
in Economy 3, hence ρ(B (3) (t)) > 1. If ρ(B) < 1 still, this
is Stage (ii) in the definition of i-Contagion. If ρ(B) becomes
greater than 1 after some time, for example because of a fear of
default by agent 14 or because of the impact of the turmoil in
Economy 3 to other economies, by definition, there has been a
contagion of instability from Economy 3 to the global one and
the cause of the local instability is a fear factor.

Financial instability contagion

1253

5. Conclusion
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Appendix A. Results on one economy
A.1. Dynamical system of wealth
Recently Choi and Douady (2012, 2013) proposed a multi-agent
model of an economy to analyse a financial crisis as breakage of
economic stability (Benhabib 1992, Benhabib and Nishimura 1979).
Their articles focus on the time period during which a crisis is seeded,
ripens and fully emerges. This section refines their results and extends
the timeline to analyse the aftermath of a crisis. Also defined in
this section are notations used in this article. We keep their original
approach and analyse the evolution of a dynamical system of wealth.
Yet, our construction of the wealth dynamical system differs from
theirs. We will construct a map directly by observing historical flow
of funds such as (Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 2012,
National Income and Product Accounts Tables 2012), which is more
realistic for verifying the model with real-life data (cf. Bê Duc and
Le Breton 2009).
Given an economy, its participants are classified into n large aggregates called agents. The vector w(t) = (w1 (t), w2 (t), . . . , wn (t))
is the wealth of the economy at time t where wi (t) be the wealth of
the agent i at t. The global wealth S(w(t)) is the sum of all wealths:
S(w(t)) =

n


wi (t)

(35)

i=1

Two assumptions on the economy are made:
Minimality A minimum number of agents are selected for the
economy to function such that any removal of an agent would make
the system collapse. Mathematically, this means that there is a minimum weight† c > 0 of each agent in the overall economy so that
wi (t)/S(w(t)) ≥ c, ∀i.

†Note that wi (t)/S(w(t)) represent the relative wealth or ‘weight’ of
the ith agent with respect to total wealth.
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Boundedness The economy is based on limited resources and market participants, therefore the production, consumption and the total
wealth of the economy is bounded above and below. Mathematically,
this means that there is time adjustment factor† α(t), some C , C > 0
such that C ≤ S(w(t))α(t)−1 ≤ C.
Hence, the normalized wealth vector w̄(t) = α(t)−1 w(t) stays
inside a compact and convex subset of Rn ,
⎫
⎧

n
⎬
⎨


n
w̄i ≤ C, wi ≥ c C ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
M̄= w̄ ∈ R  C ≤
⎭
⎩
i=1

(36)
The wealth wi (t) of the agent i at t is defined to be the sum of the
equity and debt,
(37)
wi (t) = E i (t) + Di (t)
and also the sum of liquidities L i (t) (essentially equivalent to the
monetary base, M0 in the case of the US) and invested assets K i (t)
(financial securities, property, human resources etc.),
wi (t) = L i (t) + K i (t)

(38)

As such, L i (t) produce no income, while K i (t) can produce capital
gains. It is assumed that during the time period [t, t + 1], only K i (t)
has an internal (i.e. independent of incoming or outgoing cash flows)
growth that is measured by the internal rate of return (IRR) γi (t) on
the investment.
The increase in the liquidities is money-in less money-out plus cash
raised from liquidation less new investment, therefore
L i (t + 1) =

n


Fi j (t) −

j=i

n


˜ i (t + 1)
Fki (t) − K

(39)

k=i

where Fi j (t) is the fund transferred from agent j to agent i at time t
˜ i (t + 1) is equal to new investments less liquidating part of
and K
K i (t) to raise cash. The invested asset at the next time is
˜ i (t + 1)
K i (t + 1) = (1 + γi (t)) K i (t) + K

We observe in flow of funds data such as (Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States 2012) L i (t), K i (t), and Di (t). The Di (t), K i (t)
and L i (t) evolve as follows‡ :

L i (t + 1) = L i (t) + L i (t + 1)

Let w(t) = (w1 (t), w2 (t), . . . , wn (t)) be the wealth of the economy. Now, we build a wealth dynamical system f that tracks the evolution of the w(t). First, we convert the observed variables wi (t) and
Fi j (t) to constant dollars by α(t) to obtain rescaled wealth w̄i (t) =
α(t)−1 wi (t) and rescaled flow of funds F¯i j = α(t)−1 Fi j . Then
define a map§
f : Rn −→ Rn
(w̄1 (t), w̄2 (t), . . . , w̄n (t))  −→ (w̄1 (t + 1),
w̄2 (t + 1), . . . , w̄n (t + 1)).

1≤ j≤n

concept to the piecewise
linear f to define a Jacobian matrix d f (t) =

B(t) = bi j (t) 1≤i, j≤n where
bi j (t) =

With equations (38), (39), and (43),
wi (t + 1) = wi (t) + γi (t)K i (t) +

n


Fi j (t) −

j=i

n


Fki (t). (44)

k=i

The internal return γi (t)K i (t) of the invested asset K i (t) can be
interpreted as a result of ‘self-investment’, hence replaced by
Fii (t) = γi (t)K i (t),

(45)

w(t + 1) = B(t)w(t)

wi (t + 1) = wi (t) +

j=1

Fi j (t) −

n


Fki (t)

(51)

(52)

or equivalently, for any agent i:
wi (t + 1) =

n


bi j (t)w j (t)

(53)

j=1

The elasticity coefficient between two agents i and j is defined as
the change rate of outgoing cash flow with respect to the wealth of
the payer,
Fi j (t)
(54)
ai j (t) =
w j (t)
or equivalently,
Fi j (t) = ai j (t)w j (t)

(55)

with the assumption
Fik
= 0 if
w j

hence equation (44) becomes
n


wi (t + 1)
w j (t)

and wi (t) is a change to wi at t.¶ A shift w(t) = (w1 (t),
w2 (t), . . . , wn (t)) of wealth from w(t) at time t induces a shift
w(t + 1) = (w1 (t + 1), w2 (t + 1), . . . , wn (t + 1)) at t + 1.
This means we have the following approximate equality

where
˜ i (t + 1) is equal to new net loans, i.e. new loans less
• D
payments.
• ri (t) is the average interest that applies to Di (t).

(48)

g : Rn −→ Rm
(49)
(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn )  −→ (g1 (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ), . . . , gm (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn )),
(50)


∂gi
. We apply this
the Jacobian J of g is defined to be
∂ x j 1≤i≤m

(41)
(42)
(43)

(47)

By connecting w(t) and w(t + 1) for each t in the period under
consideration, we obtain a piecewise linear map. Since the set M̄
defined in equation (36) represents all feasible wealth, we can consider
( M̄, f ) as our wealth dynamical system.
To ease the notation, we omit the ‘bar’ and write wi (t) for w̄i ,
Fi j (t) for F̄i j etc.
Given a continuous dynamical system

(40)

where γi (t) is the return on K i (t).

˜ i (t + 1)
Di (t + 1) = (1 + ri (t))Di (t) + D
˜ i (t + 1)
K i (t + 1) = (1 + γi (t))K i (t) + K

Remark A.1 Care should be taken on the nature of the flow of funds
in the above equation. Both Fi j and −Fki are ‘at-will’, or ‘required’
flow of funds from i to k that change the wealth level of wi . The
investment of i in another agent k is a fund transfer from L i (t) to
˜ i (t + 1). This is an asset reallocation that
K i (t) and expressed as K
does not change the wealth wi (t), and is not part of Fki in equation
(46).

k  = j.

(56)

(46)

k=i

†This can be thought of as a deflator, such as the GDP deflator or the
consumer price index (CPI).
˜ denotes a contribution that is different from the
‡The notation 
ordinary time-increments, e.g. Di (t + 1) = Di (t + 1) − Di (t).

§The map f is defined to be deterministic, but in Choi and Douady
(2012, 2013), the wealth dynamical system was allowed to be random
yet estimable. Appendix C of Choi and Douady (2012) explains how
the stability of an equilibrium of such a map should be understood.
¶Since wi (t) is a function of time wi (t) = wi (t + t) − wi (t) for
some time t.
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To reflect the internal change of wealth, we define the ‘self-elasticity’ A.2. Market instability indicator
aii of agent i as
The ‘market instability indicator’ ρ is defined as the spectral radius
of the Jacobian matrix B(t) of f ,
 (Fii (t))
 (γi (t)K i (t))
aii (t) =
=
,
(57)
wi (t)
wi (t)
I (t) = ρ(B(t)).
(60)
hence we have ai j (t)w j (t) = Fi j (t) for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
including j = i.
It was shown in Choi and Douady (2012) that the Jacobian B =
(bi j ) and the elasticity matrix A = (ai j ) are related such that
bii = 1 + aii −

n


aki

and

(58)

k=i

bi j = ai j

for i  = j

(59)

This relation will be used in section 4 to investigate the mechanism
of instability contagion.

The higher the indicator, the more unstable the market. In stable market conditions, the equilibrium point w̃ is an attractor, the eigenvalues
of B|w̃ have modulus less than 1 and, when the market is close enough
to the equilibrium and, as a consequence, in its basin of attraction, the
instability indicator I (t) is also below the critical value 1.
When I (t) < 1 then perturbations of the system tend to be absorbed
and disappear. On the contrary, when I (t) > 1 then most of the
perturbations contain a component that will increasingly propagate
within the system, either as a propagation of contraction of payments,
or simply as an increase of leverage making liquidity constraints
tighter and tighter and reactions to variations of income stronger and
stronger.
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